In a decision that may raise
new complications, even as it resolved old ones, the state Supreme Court
Wednesday affirmed the validity of a 1994 Shelby County referendum limiting the
county’s mayor and board of commissioners to two four-year terms.
            The decision, reached unanimously by the five Supreme Court
justices,  means that three commissioners who two years ago filed a suit to
overturn the term-limits provision may not run for reelection this year, having
been elected to two terms already since the time of the referendum. Two of the
three – Walter Bailey and Cleo Kirk – had been listed on the Democratic primary
ballot, while the third, Julian Bolton, had indicated that he might run instead
for the open 9th District congressional seat.

            It was not
immediately clear whether the state’s anti-skulduggery law, which allows for
re-opening filing deadlines under some late-withdrawal circumstances, might
apply. The situation regarding  Bailey’s District 2, Position 1 seat is further
clouded by the possibility that another Democratic primary candidate for the
seat, J.W Gibson, may be purged from the ballot by party officials reacting to
his activity in Republican Party circles over the last 10 years.

            In any case,
Bailey and Kirk have now definitively been ruled ineligible for reelection. The
Court’s decision in effect let stand an earlier Chancery Court decision
affirming the term-limits provision and dissolved a stay granted to the
plaintiffs by the state Court of Appeals. In its decision, however, the high
Court said it had acted “de novo” (from fresh examination) in making its own
affirmation of the term limits provision.

            The high Court
found, as Chancellor Tene Alissandratos had earlier, that the provision of the
county charter  imposing the two-term limit was authorized by Tennessee Code
Annotated section 5-1-201(4). The  Court also ruled that the charter provision
was the result of a lawful delegation of the legislature’s power to establish
qualifications for elected county officers and was therefore not in violation of
Article VII of Tennessee’s constitution.

            Noting that the
1994 referendum  “was approved by over 80% of the voter   of Shelby County,” the
Court took futher note of the plaintiffs’ allegation that the referendum had
been “ill-advised” but dismissed it on the ground that, whether ill-advised or
not, such a vote “does not rise to the level of a constitutional defect.”

            Simply put, the
Court ruled that both state law and the Tennessee Consitution grant that a
chartered county government like Shelby County’s is empowered to provide for the
“size, method of election, qualification for holding office, method of removal,
and procedures of the county legislative body.” And it adjuged the 1994
referendum as permissibly within the county’s discretion.

            Said the justices:
“The constitution is the truest expression of the will of the people, and it is
their intent in adopting a constitutional provision that must prevail.”

            The Court’s ruling
stated explicitly: “There is nothing in the language of the constitution to
prevent a county from placing a limit on the number of terms that may be
served.” Of the 1977 state Constitutional Convention that codified relevant law
in its present form, the justices noted, “If the delegates had wanted to
prohibit term limits as the plaintiffs contend, the delegates could have easily
added language to that effect.”

            Quoting the state
Constitution the Supreme Court opinion said that the  “General Assembly has very
broad powers and discretion,” that the 1994 Shelby County referendum was the
result of a proper delegation of those powers and that discretion, and that the
Constitution granted “broad authority to a county to go so far as to replace
its existing government in favor of an alternate government, provided the
people approve.” 

            Finally, the
Court’s decision, written by Chief Justice William M. Barker, said, “This
opinion is not subject to rehearing under Rule 39 of the Tennessee Rules of
Appellate Procedure, and the Clerk is directed to immediately issue the mandate.
Costs are taxed to the plaintiffs….”

Download a .pdf of the complete court ruling here